Revelations made by veterans of the period and the opening of various archives have thrown significant new light on the origins of Umkhonto we Sizwe.
'at the beginning of June 1961', when he and some colleagues 'came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence'. 7 The result was the establishment of Umkhonto we Sizwe, whose existence was announced to the South African public on 16 December of the same year. This was a highly symbolic date since 16 December figured in the ideology of the ruling National Party as Dingaan's Day or the Day of the Covenant, commemorating the 1838 Battle of Blood River, prior to which a party of voortrekkers preparing to confront a Zulu army had taken a public vow.
It has now become clear that Mandela's statement in his 1964 'I am prepared to die' speech did not do justice to the role played in the inception of the armed struggle by the SACP, which had received promises of support from the two Communist superpowers of the time, the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR) and China.
Related to this omission is the fact that it is now possible to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Mandela himself was a member of the Communist Party for a period in the early 1960s, notwithstanding his own denials or evasions both then and subsequently, 8 as will shortly be discussed. This throws significant new light on the recent history of South Africa. Accordingly, this article reconstructs the main outlines of how key figures in the congress alliance, the opposition formation that included both the ANC and the SACP, arrived at their momentous decision to found Umkhonto we Sizwe and to take up arms against the South African state.
The origins of South Africa's armed struggle
The drift towards armed struggle in South Africa may be traced back to the late 59 The PAC was advocating a style of radical populism that threatened to unleash a race war. Monty So, reassured by Soviet theoreticians of the suitability of a nationalist alliance, the SACP set about preparing to launch its campaign. It was clear that it would need to prepare public opinion and, more specifically, that it would require some sort of arrangement with the ANC. This had to be achieved at a time when both organisations were outlawed and many individuals were subject to various legal restrictions. Furthermore, the ANC's president, Albert Luthuli, remained committed to a strategy of non-violence. He, too, almost certainly was uninformed of the talks in the USSR and China. proponents of armed struggle with a paper trail that would justify their forthcoming change of policy. 81 In other words, the SACP, having decided to organise a campaign of armed resistance and knowing that the government remained closed to dialogue, was concerned to present matters in the best possible light for public and international consumption. Mandela was the best person for this job.
The Party also looked to Mandela to bring the ANC round to the idea of armed struggle. For while the ANC had for years been home to militants in favour of taking up arms, its president, Chief Luthuli, was an advocate of non-violence, as were other leading lights of the multilateral congress alliance that constituted the broad nationalist movement that the SACP saw as its partner in struggle. that they had substantial backing within organisations with a popular base far wider than that of the tiny SACP.
In a speech in 2010, President Jacob Zuma claimed not only that Luthuli supported the foundation of Umkhonto we Sizwe, but that he was actually the one who gave it its name. 88 Yet a study of Luthuli's writings concludes that he never renounced his personal commitment to non-violent methods, 89 on account of which he was awarded a Nobel peace prize in 1961, and that he never underwent a conversion to the cause of armed struggle. It is possible that both versions are accurate in the sense that Luthuli remained a partisan of non-violence while wishing to remain informed of events affecting the movement of which he remained the nominal president until his death in 1967. He continued to attend meetings that tracked the progress of the ANC abroad, without questioning the creation of Umkhonto we Sizwe. 90 Joe Slovo confirmed the strength of the support for non-violence within the ANC and allied movements when he stated that that the main reason for making Umkhonto we Sizwe independent was 'that we had just emerged from a phase when the whole congress movement had not officially broken with old policies', the Indian congresses being especially deeply committed to non-violence. 91 What is clear, however, is that once leading members of the ANC had committed themselves to a policy of violence, albeit under the flag of the nominally autonomous organisation called Umkhonto we Sizwe, the authority of Luthuli, banned by the government and presiding over a movement that was proceeding on a different path, drained away. Luthuli played little further role in ANC decision-making, which passed swiftly into the hands of members who went into exile. leading members were also the commanders of a guerrilla force, and Umkhonto we Sizwe became regarded simply as the ANC's army. The bulk of ANC members never knew, then or subsequently, how their organisation had been bounced into adopting the armed struggle.
Members of the South African Communist Party were adept at backroom politics of this type. The Party was, as Rusty Bernstein put it, 'a sect'. 100 Since the original Communist Party had been banned by law in 1950, its members had adopted the practice of joining other organisations through which they could exercise their selfappointed role in the vanguard of revolutionary change. These were circumstances to which Leninist techniques of political organisation were perfectly adapted. Ben
Turok was later to recall 'how easy it was for a small group like ours to exert much influence in the mass movement without giving away our existence'. 101 In the many cases where Party members were also members of another organisation, such as the ANC or the Congress of Democrats, internal Party discipline required that 'at all times, the first loyalty of Party members is to their Party', 102 the very rule that Kotane flouted in 1961 when he argued in ANC meetings against adopting a policy of armed struggle.
The armed struggle in cold war context
Armed with a mandate from the round of ANC meetings in June 1961, Joe Slovo and
Nelson Mandela led the effort to form Umkhonto we Sizwe into a real organisation.
Within six months the new outfit had some 250 members 103 in fact was almost certainly the work of one of the liberal groups that fused to form the ARM. The PAC was organising militant networks that were soon to result in the emergence of Poqo. 108 Straining to impose its own authority over the emerging sabotage campaign, the SACP infiltrated some of its own people into liberal networks. They were Joe Gqabi, Wilton Mkwayi, Patrick Mthembu and Steve Naidoo, the latter coming from London, where he had been living for some years.
After arriving in China the trainees were divided into two groups, one sent to ShenYon military academy, the other stationed in Nanjing. with larger groups to follow.
At the outset, Umkhonto we Sizwe's strategic thinking was based on the supposition that the apartheid state was brittle enough for a determined offensive to inspire a wider insurrection that would overwhelm it. This optimism was sustained by a Nevertheless, Ludi said that he didn't know whether the CIA had actually tipped off the South African police about Mandela's whereabouts. 126 Some reports suggest that Ludi eventually became more explicit about Shirley's role. 127 Ludi was a credible source as he and Shirley were so close that they later went into business together.
According to one newspaper investigation carried out after Mandela's eventual release, CIA officers at the time of his arrest considered it one of their 'greatest coups'. 128 The US government has contested the story of CIA involvement, but more than one former South African security officer recalls Van den Bergh admitting that the CIA gave information leading to Mandela's arrest. 129 Three decades after Mandela's arrest, the story of a CIA tip-off was regarded as accurate by former diplomats who had served at the US embassy during that period. not been made public. 135 However, in light of the available evidence it is reasonable to state that, after the police had raided the Umkhonto we Sizwe and SACP headquarters at Lilliesleaf Farm in Rivonia in July 1963 and found hundreds of documents, they were not mistaken in concluding that the central committee of the SACP was 'the heart of armed resistance'. 136 How this came about is best understood by reference to the climate of cold war rivalry that marked international affairs at that time.
As Magubane and others noted in their review of the literature concerning the respective roles of the ANC and the SACP in the adoption of armed struggle, 'a common ploy is to aver that both did so "at about the same time"'. 137 The demonstration that Nelson Mandela was a prominent Party member in the early 1960s
should cause us to reject the oft-told story of MK's emergence from circles of ANC and SACP activists working more or less in parallel. In fact, it is clear that the Party took the decision first and then influenced the ANC, with Mandela playing a prominent intermediary role.
The Party was able to influence the ANC not least by its very effective use of its own particular style of legalism. Party members were bound by the discipline imposed by the rules of their organisation and the decisions of their own governing body. While they were also encouraged to join other organisations, including the ANC, they were at all times bound to uphold their loyalty to the Party. 138 At the same time, they made a careful distinction between actions undertaken on the formal instructions of the Party and those carried out in an informal capacity or while acting as a member of another organisation, in which case the Party as an institution could take its distance.
A good example is provided by another speech from the dock, this one by the former 
